Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Novalis, B Hale / C Wright and John Cottingham

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Ought not logic, the theory of relations, be applied to mathematics?
     From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 38)
     A reaction: Bolzano was 19 when his was written. I presume Novalis would have been excited by set theory (even though he was a hyper-romantic).
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
     Full Idea: Anyone should agree that a justification for regarding a singular term as having objectual reference is provided just as soon as one has justification for regarding as true certain atomic statements in which it functions as a singular term.
     From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §9)
     A reaction: The meat of this idea is hidden in the word 'certain'. See Idea 10314 for Hale's explanation. Without that, the proposal strikes me as absurd.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis]
     Full Idea: A problem is a solid, synthetic mass which is broken up by means of the penetrating power of the mind.
     From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 04)
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
     Full Idea: If we stipulate that 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, we speedily arrive at the contradiction that 'heterological' is itself heterological just in case it is not.
     From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.2)