Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Novalis, C.I. Lewis and Jean Calvin

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic

9358	There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The fact is that there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms and such that whoever, using it, avoids false premises, will never reach a false conclusion.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.366)
	A reaction: As the man who invented modal logic in five different versions, he speaks with some authority. Logicians now debate which version is the best, so how could that be decided? You could avoid false conclusions by never reasoning at all.

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics

19597	Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis]
	Full Idea: Ought not logic, the theory of relations, be applied to mathematics?
	From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 38)
	A reaction: Bolzano was 19 when his was written. I presume Novalis would have been excited by set theory (even though he was a hyper-romantic).

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle

9357	Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its negative. It declares our purpose to make a complete dichotomy of experience, ..which is only our penchant for simplicity.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.365)
	A reaction: I find this view quite appealing. 'Look, it's either F or it isn't!' is a dogmatic attitude which irritates a lot of people, and appears to be dispensible. Intuitionists in mathematics dispense with the principle, and vagueness threatens it.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

9364	Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: A name must represent some uniformity in experience or it names nothing.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368)
	A reaction: I like this because, in the quintessentially linguistic debate about the exact logical role of names, it reminds us that names arise because of the way reality is; they are not sui generis private games for logicians.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai

19581	A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis]
	Full Idea: A problem is a solid, synthetic mass which is broken up by means of the penetrating power of the mind.
	From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 04)