Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Paul Audi, Charles Sanders Peirce and Bob Hale

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic

19256	Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Every attempt to understand anything at least hopes that the very objects of study themselves are subject to a logic more or less identical with that which we employ.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VIII)
	A reaction: The idea that external objects might be subject to a logic has become very unfashionable since Frege, but I love the idea. I'm inclined to think that we derive our logic from the world, so I'm a bit more confident that Peirce.

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism

21493	Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]
	Full Idea: The pure mathematician deals exclusively with hypotheses. Whether or not there is any corresponding real thing, he does not care.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892], CP5.567), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'separation'
	A reaction: [Dated 1902] Maybe we should identify a huge branch of human learning as Hyptheticals. Professor of Hypotheticals at Cambridge University. The trouble is it would have to include computer games. So why does maths matter more than games?

14783	Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Mathematics is purely hypothetical: it produces nothing but conditional propositions. Logic, on the contrary, is categorical in its assertions. True, it is a normative science, and not a mere discovery of what really is. It discovers ends from means.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], II)

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention

19289	Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale]
	Full Idea: An old objection to conventionalism claims that it confuses sentences with propositions, confusing what makes sentences mean what they do with what makes them (as propositions) true.
	From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 05.2)
	A reaction: The conventions would presumably apply to the sentences, but not to the propositions. Since I think that focusing on propositions solves a lot of misunderstandings in modern philosophy, I like the sound of this.