display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
| 10666 | Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: It may be that plural reference gives atomism the resources to state complex facts without needing to refer to complex things. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 1) | |
| A reaction: This seems the most interesting metaphysical implication of the possibility of plural quantification. |
| 10669 | Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: If all properties are distributive, plural reference is just a handy abbreviation to avoid repetition (as in 'A and B are hungry', to avoid 'A is hungry and B is hungry'), but not all properties are distributive (as in 'some people surround a table'). | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 2) | |
| A reaction: The characteristic examples to support plural quantification involve collective activity and relations, which might be weeded out of our basic ontology, thus leaving singular quantification as sufficient. |
| 10675 | A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: Singular comprehension principles have a bad reputation, but the plural comprehension principle says that given a condition on individuals, there are some things such that something is one of them iff it meets the condition. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 4) |