Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stilpo, Anthony Quinton and David Lewis

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

---

5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

15533	We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Substitutionalists simulate quantification over fictional characters by quantifying for real over fictional names.
	From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.159)
	A reaction: I would say that a fiction is a file of conceptual information, identified by a label. The label brings baggage with it, and there is no existence in the label.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification

15731	Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis]
	Full Idea: I consider some apparent quantification over sets or classes of whatnots to carry genuine ontological commitment to 'sets' of them, but sometimes it is innocent plural quantification committed only to whatnots, for which I use 'class'.
	From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5 n37)
	A reaction: How do you tell whether you are committed to a set or not? Can I claim an innocent plurality each time, while you accuse me of a guilty set? Can I firmly commit to a set, to be told that I can never manage more than a plurality?

15525	Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis]
	Full Idea: There is an irremediable lack of a complete axiom system for plural quantification.
	From: David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 4.7)

15518	I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis]
	Full Idea: I agree fully with Boolos on substantive questions about plural quantification, though I would make less than he does of the connection with second-order logic.
	From: David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 3.2 n2)
	A reaction: Deep matters, but my inclination is to agree with Lewis, as I have never been able to see why talk of plural quantification led straight on to second-order logic. A plural is just some objects, not some higher-order entity.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification

15534	We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis]
	Full Idea: We can quantify over Meinongian objects by quantifying for real over property bundles (such as the bundle of roundness and squareness).
	From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.159)