Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stilpo, George Boole and John Searle

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

---

9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic

3809	If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
	Full Idea: If you think you need a rule to infer q from 'p and (if p then q)', then you would also need a rule to infer p from p.
	From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II)

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic

8686	Boole made logic more mathematical, with algebra, quantifiers and probability [Boole, by Friend]
	Full Idea: Boole (followed by Frege) began to turn logic from a branch of philosophy into a branch of mathematics. He brought an algebraic approach to propositions, and introduced the notion of a quantifier and a type of probabilistic reasoning.
	From: report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854], 3.2) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics
	A reaction: The result was that logic not only became more mathematical, but also more specialised. We now have two types of philosopher, those steeped in mathematical logic and the rest. They don't always sing from the same songsheet.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

7746	We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
	Full Idea: If Tully=Cicero is synthetic, the names must have different senses, which seems implausible, for we don't normally think of proper names as having senses in the way that predicates do (we do not, e.g., give definitions of proper names).
	From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.89)
	A reaction: It is probably necessary to prize apart the question of whether Tully 'has' (intrinsically) a sense, from whether we think of Tully in that way. Stacks of books have appeared about this one, since Kripke.

7747	How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
	Full Idea: It seems that a proper name could not have a reference unless it did have a sense, for how, unless the name has a sense, is it to be correlated with the object?
	From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.91)
	A reaction: This might (just) be the most important question ever asked in modern philosophy, since it provoked Kripke into answering it, by giving a social, causal, externalist account of how names (and hence lots of language) actually work. But Searle has a point.

7748	'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
	Full Idea: Aristotle being identical with an object that was originally christened will not suffice, for the force of "Aristotle" is greater than the force of 'identical with an object named "Aristotle"', for not just any object named "Aristotle" will do.
	From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.93)
	A reaction: This anticipates Kripke's proposal to base reference on baptism. I remain unsure about how rigid a designation of Aristotle could be, in a possible world where his father died young, and he became an illiterate soldier who hates philosophy.

7749	Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
	Full Idea: To use a proper name referringly is to presuppose the truth of certain uniquely referring descriptive statements. ...Names are pegs on which to hang descriptions.
	From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.94)
	A reaction: This 'cluster' view of Searle's has become notorious, but I think one could at least try to mount a defence. The objection to Searle is that none of the descriptions are necessary, unlike just being the named object.

7750	Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
	Full Idea: If asked whether or not proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer, the answer is 'yes, in a loose sort of way'.
	From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.96)
	A reaction: It seems to be inviting trouble to assert that a connection is both 'logical' and 'loose'. Clearly Searle has been reading too much later Wittgenstein. This is probably the weakest point in Searle's proposal, which brought a landslide of criticism.

5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof

22277	Boole's method was axiomatic, achieving economy, plus multiple interpretations [Boole, by Potter]
	Full Idea: Boole's work was an early example of the axiomatic method, whereby intellectual economy is achieved by studying a set of axioms in which the primitive terms have multiple interpretations.
	From: report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Boole'
	A reaction: Unclear about this. I suppose the axioms are just syntactic, and a range of semantic interpretations can be applied. Are De Morgan's Laws interpretations, or implications of the syntactic axioms? The latter, I think.

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic

3810	In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
	Full Idea: In real-life reasoning it is the semantic content that guarantees the validity of the inference, not the syntactical rule.
	From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II)