Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Bertrand Russell, Karl Leonhard Reinhold and Jonathan Schaffer
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97 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
6110
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Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
21588
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Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell]
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6107
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It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
14452
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All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell]
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16486
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The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
21495
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Theoretical and practical politics are both concerned with the best lives for individuals [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
14462
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In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
5395
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Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
14106
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Implication cannot be defined [Russell]
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14108
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It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
14464
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Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell]
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14167
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The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell]
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10057
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Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell]
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22329
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Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock]
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12444
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Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10053
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Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
21539
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Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell]
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18944
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Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell]
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2947
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Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
7758
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'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan]
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6092
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In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell]
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6101
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Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell]
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6115
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Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell]
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7528
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Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
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10373
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Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
23476
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Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell]
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23477
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We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell]
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21586
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The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell]
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21597
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Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
14105
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There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18722
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Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell]
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16489
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Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
16479
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'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell]
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16481
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'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell]
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16487
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Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell]
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16480
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A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell]
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16483
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Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
14104
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Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
14114
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Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell]
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5772
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The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
21566
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'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
6102
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You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
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10423
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There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
14458
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Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell]
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4945
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Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
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18942
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Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
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7745
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Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
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5386
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Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell]
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7744
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Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
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10450
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Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach]
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14457
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Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
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18941
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Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
15159
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The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
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10449
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Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
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6410
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The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
2612
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Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer]
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7757
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"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18943
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Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
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6439
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Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
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10426
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A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
7311
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The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
14455
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'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
6411
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Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
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10433
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Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
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5385
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The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
1608
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The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
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7754
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Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
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21529
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Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
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6333
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The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
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6412
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Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
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7743
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Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
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7310
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Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
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12006
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Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
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4569
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Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
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11009
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Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
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21549
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The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
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12796
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Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
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7532
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Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
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11988
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Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
14137
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'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
6061
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Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn]
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
18273
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Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17629
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Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell]
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17630
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The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell]
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17640
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Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell]
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6109
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Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
7557
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To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell]
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14149
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The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell]
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21585
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The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
21565
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Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
15895
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Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine]
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
13365
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Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
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10711
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Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
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6407
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The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling]
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
21564
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Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell]
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21567
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'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
16475
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A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell]
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