Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Buddhaghosa, Saul A. Kripke and George Boolos

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25 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
14249 Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley]
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10830 Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
10829 A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
10437 Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
4949 Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
4951 A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
17031 A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
9175 We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
8957 Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
9171 The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
10428 Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
4959 A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
16982 A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10832 '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10792 The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10834 Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
13841 Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking]