Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Charles Sanders Peirce, Buddhaghosa and Bertrand Russell

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38 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell]
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell]
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach]
Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer]
"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]