Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Dennis Whitcomb, Ruth Barcan Marcus and Fraser MacBride
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
11 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10794
|
The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
|
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18489
|
Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
|
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18476
|
'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
|
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
10786
|
Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
|
10788
|
Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
|
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10799
|
Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
|
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10790
|
Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
|
10791
|
Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
|
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10785
|
Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
|
10795
|
Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
|
10798
|
A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
|