Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Gareth Evans, Jos L. Zalabardo and William S. Jevons

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16 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
10897 A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10893 Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo]
10899 Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
10896 Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9038 We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
5824 How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
9042 A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10898 The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo]
10902 We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10892 We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10895 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo]
10900 Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
10894 A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo]
10901 Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10903 A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo]