Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Dag Prawitz and Ashvaghosha
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
11 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
|
13831
|
Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz]
|
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
|
2442
|
Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor]
|
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
|
13827
|
Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz]
|
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
|
13825
|
Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz]
|
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
|
12664
|
A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor]
|
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
|
3005
|
'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor]
|
|
12648
|
Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor]
|
|
12650
|
'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor]
|
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
|
13823
|
In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz]
|
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
|
13826
|
Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz]
|
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
|
12656
|
P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor]
|