Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Gottlob Frege and Keith Donnellan

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19 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
8447 In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege]
3005 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor]
12648 Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor]
12650 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor]
18772 We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
14075 Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
10424 A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
18773 People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
8448 Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
4978 The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
10510 Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18937 If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
18940 It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
18939 In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
7760 Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
13733 Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5811 A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
5812 Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
5814 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]