Combining Philosophers
Ideas for John Cottingham, Gottlob Frege and David Miller
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
12 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
8447
|
In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege]
|
18772
|
We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege]
|
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
14075
|
Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
|
10424
|
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
|
18773
|
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
|
8448
|
Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege]
|
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
4978
|
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
|
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
10510
|
Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale]
|
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18937
|
If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
|
18940
|
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
|
18939
|
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
|
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
13733
|
Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
|