Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Keith Donnellan and Michael Jubien
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12 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
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13378
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It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
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13402
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We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien]
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13405
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The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
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13399
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Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
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7760
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Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
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5811
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A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
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5812
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Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
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5814
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'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
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13398
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We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
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11115
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'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
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13392
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Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien]
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5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
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9968
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A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien]
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