Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Keith Donnellan and Ruth Barcan Marcus
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13 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
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10794
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The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
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10786
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Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
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10788
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Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
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7760
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Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
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5811
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A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
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5812
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Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
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5814
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'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
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10799
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Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
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10790
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Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
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10791
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Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
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10785
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Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
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10795
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Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
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10798
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A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
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