display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
8 ideas
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate. |
9923 | We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: The modal strategy for numbers is to replace assumptions about the actual existence of numbers by assumptions about the possible existence of numbers | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.B.3.a) | |
A reaction: This seems to be quite a good way of dealing with very large numbers and infinities. It is not clear whether 5 is so regularly actualised that we must consider it as permanent, or whether it is just a prominent permanent possibility. |
15923 | Poincaré rejected the actual infinite, claiming definitions gave apparent infinity to finite objects [Poincaré, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Poincaré rejected the actual infinite. He viewed mathematics that is apparently concerned with the actual infinite as actually concerning the finite linguistic definitions the putatively describe actually infinite objects. | |
From: report of Henri Poincaré (On the Nature of Mathematical Reasoning [1894]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite |
10180 | Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects; it is a matter of indifference if the objects are replaced by others, provided the relations do not change. They are interested in form alone, not matter. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Hypothesis [1902], p.20), quoted by E Reck / M Price - Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths §6 | |
A reaction: This connects modern structuralism with Aritotle's interest in the 'form' of things. Contrary to the views of the likes of Frege, it is hard to see that the number '7' has any properties at all, apart from its relations. A daffodil would do just as well. |
9925 | Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: Usually structuralism and nominalism are considered rivals. But structuralism can also be the first step in a strategy of nominalist reconstrual or paraphrase. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.C.0) | |
A reaction: Hellman and later Chihara seem to be the main proponents of nominalist structuralism. My sympathies lie with this strategy. Are there objects at the nodes of the structure, or is the structure itself platonic? Mill offers a route. |
9934 | Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: The transition from using number words purely as adjectives to using them extensively as nouns has been traced to 'around the time of Plato'. | |
From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], III.C.2.a) | |
A reaction: [The cite Kneale and Kneale VI,§2 for this] It is just too tempting to think that in fact Plato (and early Platonists) were totally responsible for this shift, since the whole reification of numbers seems to be inherently platonist. |
9916 | Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no! [Poincaré, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Poincaré once exclaimed, 'Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no!'. | |
From: report of Henri Poincaré (talk [1901]) by Hilary Putnam - Models and Reality | |
A reaction: An interesting view. It mustn't be assumed that conventions are not rooted in something. Maybe a sort of pragmatism is implied. |
18203 | Avoid non-predicative classifications and definitions [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: Never consider any objects but those capable of being defined in a finite number of word ...Avoid non-predicative classifications and definitions. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (The Logic of Infinity [1909], p.63), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.4 |