display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
9 ideas
6298 | Kitcher says maths is an idealisation of the world, and our operations in dealing with it [Kitcher, by Resnik] |
Full Idea: Kitcher says maths is an 'idealising theory', like some in physics; maths idealises features of the world, and practical operations, such as segregating and matching (numbering), measuring, cutting, moving, assembling (geometry), and collecting (sets). | |
From: report of Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984]) by Michael D. Resnik - Maths as a Science of Patterns One.4.2.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be an interesting line, which is trying to be fairly empirical, and avoid basing mathematics on purely a priori understanding. Nevertheless, we do not learn idealisation from experience. Resnik labels Kitcher an anti-realist. |
12392 | Mathematical a priorism is conceptualist, constructivist or realist [Kitcher] |
Full Idea: Proposals for a priori mathematical knowledge have three main types: conceptualist (true in virtue of concepts), constructivist (a construct of the human mind) and realist (in virtue of mathematical facts). | |
From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 02.3) | |
A reaction: Realism is pure platonism. I think I currently vote for conceptualism, with the concepts deriving from the concrete world, and then being extended by fictional additions, and shifts in the notion of what 'number' means. |
18078 | The interest or beauty of mathematics is when it uses current knowledge to advance undestanding [Kitcher] |
Full Idea: What makes a question interesting or gives it aesthetic appeal is its focussing of the project of advancing mathematical understanding, in light of the concepts and systems of beliefs already achieved. | |
From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 09.3) | |
A reaction: Kitcher defends explanation (the source of understanding, presumably) in terms of unification with previous theories (the 'concepts and systems'). I always have the impression that mathematicians speak of 'beauty' when they see economy of means. |
12426 | The 'beauty' or 'interest' of mathematics is just explanatory power [Kitcher] |
Full Idea: Insofar as we can honor claims about the aesthetic qualities or the interest of mathematical inquiries, we should do so by pointing to their explanatory power. | |
From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 09.4) | |
A reaction: I think this is a good enough account for me (but probably not for my friend Carl!). Beautiful cars are particularly streamlined. Beautiful people look particularly healthy. A beautiful idea is usually wide-ranging. |
12395 | Real numbers stand to measurement as natural numbers stand to counting [Kitcher] |
Full Idea: The real numbers stand to measurement as the natural numbers stand to counting. | |
From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.4) |
12425 | Complex numbers were only accepted when a geometrical model for them was found [Kitcher] |
Full Idea: An important episode in the acceptance of complex numbers was the development by Wessel, Argand, and Gauss, of a geometrical model of the numbers. | |
From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 07.5) | |
A reaction: The model was in terms of vectors and rotation. New types of number are spurned until they can be shown to integrate into a range of mathematical practice, at which point mathematicians change the meaning of 'number' (without consulting us). |
18071 | A one-operation is the segregation of a single object [Kitcher] |
Full Idea: We perform a one-operation when we perform a segregative operation in which a single object is segregated. | |
From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.3) | |
A reaction: This is part of Kitcher's empirical but constructive account of arithmetic, which I find very congenial. He avoids the word 'unit', and goes straight to the concept of 'one' (which he treats as more primitive than zero). |
18066 | The old view is that mathematics is useful in the world because it describes the world [Kitcher] |
Full Idea: There is an old explanation of the utility of mathematics. Mathematics describes the structural features of our world, features which are manifested in the behaviour of all the world's inhabitants. | |
From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.1) | |
A reaction: He only cites Russell in modern times as sympathising with this view, but Kitcher gives it some backing. I think the view is totally correct. The digression produced by Cantorian infinities has misled us. |
18083 | With infinitesimals, you divide by the time, then set the time to zero [Kitcher] |
Full Idea: The method of infinitesimals is that you divide by the time, and then set the time to zero. | |
From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 10.2) |