Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, William of Ockham and Plato

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7 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We aim for elevated discussion of pure numbers, not attaching them to physical objects [Plato]
     Full Idea: Our discussion of numbers leads the soul forcibly upward and compels it to discuss the numbers themselves, never permitting anyone to propose for discussion numbers attached to visible or tangible bodies.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 525d)
     A reaction: This strikes me as very important, because it shows that the platonist view of numbers places little or no importance on counting, inviting the question of whether they could be understood in complete ignorance of the process of counting.
In pure numbers, all ones are equal, with no internal parts [Plato]
     Full Idea: With those numbers that can be grasped only in thought, ..each one is equal to every other, without the least difference and containing no internal parts.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 526a)
     A reaction: [Two voices in the conversation are elided] Intriguing and tantalising. Does 13 have internal parts, in the platonist view? If so, is it more than the sum of its parts? Is Plato committed to numbers being built from indistinguishable abstract units/
Geometry is not an activity, but the study of unchanging knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: Geometers talk as if they were actually doing something, and the point of their theorems is to have some effect (like 'squaring'). ...But the sole purpose is knowledge, of things which exist forever, not coming into existence and passing away.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 527a)
     A reaction: Modern Constructivism defends the view which Plato is attacking. The existence of real infinities can be doubted simply because we have not got enough time to construct them.
We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato]
     Full Idea: It must surely be true that a man who has completely mastered arithmetic knows all numbers? Because there are pieces of knowledge covering all numbers in his soul.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 198b)
     A reaction: This clearly views numbers as objects. Expectation of knowing them all is a bit startling! They also appear to be innate in us, and hence they appear to be Forms. See Aristotle's comment in Idea 645.
One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato]
     Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a)
     A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato]
     Full Idea: We see the same thing to be both one and an unlimited number at the same time.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 525a)
     A reaction: Frege makes the same point, that a pair of boots is both two and one. The point is at its strongest in opposition to empirical accounts of arithmetic. However, Mill observes that pebbles can be both 5 and 3+2, without contradiction.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Number is nothing but the actual numbered things themselves. Hence just as unity is not an accident added to the thing which is one, so number is not an accident of the things which are numbered.
     From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], I.c.xliv)
     A reaction: [William does not necessarily agree with this view] It strikes me as a key point here that any account of the numbers had better work for 'one', though 'zero' might be treated differently. Some people seem to think unity is a property of things.