Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, George Boolos and Stephen Read

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3 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos]
     Full Idea: The existence of infinitely many natural numbers seems to me no more troubling than that of infinitely many computer programs or sentences of English. There is, for example, no longest sentence, since any number of 'very's can be inserted.
     From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.129)
     A reaction: If you really resisted an infinity of natural numbers, presumably you would also resist an actual infinity of 'very's. The fact that it is unclear what could ever stop a process doesn't guarantee that the process is actually endless.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read]
     Full Idea: Every potential infinity seems to suggest an actual infinity - e.g. generating successors suggests they are really all there already; cutting the line suggests that the point where the cut is made is already in place.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.8)
     A reaction: Finding a new gambit in chess suggests it was there waiting for us, but we obviously invented chess. Daft.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos]
     Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge nothing in mathematics or science requires the existence of very high orders of infinity.
     From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.122)
     A reaction: He is referring to particular high orders of infinity implied by set theory. Personally I want to wield Ockham's Razor. Is being implied by set theory a sufficient reason to accept such outrageous entities into our ontology?