Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Jackson/Pargetter/Prior and Kit Fine

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers


6 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It is not implausible that before the 'introduction' of complex numbers, it would have been incorrect for mathematicians to claim that there was a solution to the equation 'x^2 = -1' under a completely unrestricted understanding of 'there are'.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009])
     A reaction: I have adopted this as the crucial test question for anyone's attitude to platonism in mathematics. I take it as obvious that complex numbers were simply invented so that such equations could be dealt with. They weren't 'discovered'!
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Arguments such as the dispensability argument are attempting to show something about the essentially non-numerical character of physical reality, rather than something about the nature or non-existence of the numbers themselves.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.160)
     A reaction: This is aimed at Hartry Field. If Quine was right, and we only believe in numbers because of our science, and then Field shows our science doesn't need it, then Fine would be wrong. Quine must be wrong, as well as Field.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Logicists traditionally claim that the theorems of mathematics can be derived by logical means from the relevant definitions of the terms, and that these theorems are epistemically innocent (knowable without Kantian intuition or empirical confirmation).
     From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2)
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: My Proceduralism offers axiom-free foundations for mathematics. Axioms give way to the stipulation of procedures. We obtain a form of logicism, but with a procedural twist, and with a logic which is ontologically neutral, and no assumption of objects.
     From: Kit Fine (Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects [2005], 1)
     A reaction: [See Ideas 9222 and 9223 for his Proceduralism] Sounds like philosophical heaven. We get to take charge of mathematics, without the embarrassment of declaring ourselves to be platonists. Someone, not me, should evaluate this.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
The objects and truths of mathematics are imperative procedures for their construction [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I call my new approach to mathematics 'proceduralism'. It agrees with Hilbert and Poincaré that the objects and truths are postulations, but takes them to be imperatival rather than indicative in form; not propositions, but procedures for construction.
     From: Kit Fine (Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects [2005], Intro)
     A reaction: I'm not sure how an object or a truth can be a procedure, any more than a house can be a procedure. If a procedure doesn't have a product then it is an idle way to pass the time. The view seems to be related to fictionalism.
My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: My Proceduralism has one simple rule (introduce an object), and four complex rules: Composition (combining two procedures), Conditionality (if A, do B), Universality (do a procedure for every x), and Iteration (rule to keep doing B).
     From: Kit Fine (Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects [2005], 1)
     A reaction: It sounds like a highly artificial and private game which Fine has invented, but he claims that this is the sort of thing that practising mathematicians have always done.