Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Jeff McMahan and Stewart Shapiro

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10 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: It is well known that virtually every field of mathematics can be reduced to, or modelled in, set theory.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], Intro)
     A reaction: The word 'virtually' is tantalising. The fact that something can be 'modeled' in set theory doesn't mean it IS set theory. Most weather can be modeled in a computer.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Complex numbers can be defined as reals, which are defined as rationals, then integers, then naturals [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: 'Definitions' of integers as pairs of naturals, rationals as pairs of integers, reals as Cauchy sequences of rationals, and complex numbers as pairs of reals are reductive foundations of various fields.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 2.1)
     A reaction: On p.30 (bottom) Shapiro objects that in the process of reduction the numbers acquire properties they didn't have before.
The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: It is surely wise to identify the positions in the natural numbers structure with their counterparts in the integer, rational, real and complex number structures.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.2)
     A reaction: The point is that this might be denied, since 3, 3/1, 3.00.., and -3*i^2 are all arrived at by different methods of construction. Natural 3 has a predecessor, but real 3 doesn't. I agree, intuitively, with Shapiro. Russell (1919) disagreed.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
Only higher-order languages can specify that 0,1,2,... are all the natural numbers that there are [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: The main problem of characterizing the natural numbers is to state, somehow, that 0,1,2,.... are all the numbers that there are. We have seen that this can be accomplished with a higher-order language, but not in a first-order language.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 9.1.4)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Natural numbers are the finite ordinals, and integers are equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: By convention, the natural numbers are the finite ordinals, the integers are certain equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals, etc.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 9.3)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Real numbers are either Cauchy sequences of rational numbers (interpreted as pairs of integers), or else real numbers can be thought of as Dedekind cuts, certain sets of rational numbers. So π is a Dedekind cut, or an equivalence class of sequences.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], 2.5)
     A reaction: This question is parallel to the question of whether natural numbers are Zermelo sets or Von Neumann sets. The famous problem is that there seems no way of deciding. Hence, for Shapiro, we are looking at models, not actual objects.
Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: There is no more to understanding the real-number structure than knowing how to use the language of analysis. .. One learns the axioms of the implicit definition. ...These determine the realtionships between real numbers.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], 4.9)
     A reaction: This, of course, is the structuralist view of such things, which isn't really interested in the intrinsic nature of anything, but only in its relations. The slogan that 'meaning is use' seems to be in the background.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: A sequence a1,a2,... of rational numbers is 'Cauchy' if for each rational number ε>0 there is a natural number N such that for all natural numbers m, n, if m>N and n>N then -ε < am - an < ε.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 7.2 n4)
     A reaction: The sequence is 'Cauchy' if N exists.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: A Dedekind Cut is a division of rationals into two set (A1,A2) where every member of A1 is less than every member of A2. If n is the largest A1 or the smallest A2, the cut is produced by n. Some cuts aren't produced by rationals.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], 5.4)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Foundations without Foundationalism [1991], 5.1.2)