Combining Philosophers
Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, F.R. Tennant and E Reck / M Price
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24 ideas
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
10165
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'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
10174
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Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10164
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Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
10624
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The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
8784
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Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
8787
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The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10172
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Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10167
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Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
10169
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Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price]
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10179
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There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price]
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10181
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Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price]
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10182
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There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
10168
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Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price]
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10178
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Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
10176
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Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price]
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10177
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Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10629
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If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
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10628
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The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
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10171
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The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price]
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8788
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Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright]
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
10622
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The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
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8783
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Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright]
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12225
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Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
12224
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Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
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