10512
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The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale]
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Full Idea:
The 'concrete/abstract' distinction has a strong intuitive feel, and can seem to be drawable by familiar contrasts, between what can/cannot be perceived, what can/cannot be involved in causal interactions, and is/is not located in space and time.
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From:
Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.I)
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A reaction:
Problems arise, needless to say. The idea of an abstraction can be causal, and abstractions seem to change. If universals are abstract, we seem to perceive some of them. They can hardly be non-spatial if they have a temporal beginning and end.
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10520
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Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale]
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Full Idea:
In familiar, though doubtless not wholly problematic jargon, token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract.
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From:
Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III)
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A reaction:
This is indeed problematic. The marks may be tokens, but the preliminary to identifying the type is to see that the marks are in fact words. To grasp the concrete, grasp the abstraction. An excellent example of the blurring of the distinction.
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10524
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There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale]
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Full Idea:
The domain of the abstract can be seen as exemplifying a hierarchical structure, with differences of level reflecting the number of steps of abstraction, via appropriate equivalence relations, required for recognition at different levels.
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From:
Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III)
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A reaction:
I think this is right, and so does almost everyone else, since people cheerfully talk of 'somewhat' abstract and 'highly' abstract. Don't dream of a neat picture though. You might reach a level by two steps from one direction, and four from another.
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