|
12217
|
For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
We need to straddle both of Carnap's internal and external views. It is only by standing outside of reality that we are able to occupy a standpoint from which the constitution of reality can be adequately described.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.174)
|
|
A reaction:
See Idea 4840! I thoroughly approve of this idea, which almost amounts to a Credo for the modern metaphysician. Since we can think outside our room, or our country, or our era, or our solar system, I think we can do what Fine is demanding.
|
|
15048
|
In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
The first main approach says metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'objective' or 'factual'. ...According to the second conception, metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'irreducible' or 'fundamental'.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
Fine is defending the 'fundamental' approach, via the 'grounding' relation. The whole structure, though, seems to be reality. In particular, a complete story must include the relations which facilitate more than mere fundamentals.
|
|
15072
|
Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
At the bottom are tensed or temporal facts, subject to the vicissitudes of time and hence of the world. Then come the timeless though worldly facts, subject to the world but not to time. Top are transcendental facts, subject to neither world nor time.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08)
|
|
A reaction:
For all of Fine's awesome grasp of logic and semantics, when he divides reality up as boldly as this I start to side a bit with the sceptics about modern metaphysics (like Ladyman and Ross). I daresay Fine acknowledges that it is 'speculative'.
|
|
9211
|
A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
By challenging the assumption that reality is 'absolute' (not relative to a standpoint), or that reality is 'coherent' (it is of a piece, from one standpoint), one accepts worldly facts without a privilege standpoint. I call this 'non-standard' realism.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p.15)
|
|
A reaction:
Fine's essay 'Tense and Reality' explores his proposal. I'm not drawn to either of his challenges. I have always taken as articles of faith that there could be a God's Eye view of all of reality, and that everything coheres, independent of our view.
|
|
17287
|
Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
Given any facts, there will be a fusion of those facts. Given the facts that the ball is red and that it is round, there is a fused fact that it is 'red and round'.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.10)
|
|
A reaction:
This is how we make 'units' for counting. Any type of thing which can be counted can be fused, such as the first five prime numbers, forming the 'first' group for some discussion. Any objects can be fused to make a unit - but is it thereby a 'unity'?
|
|
15071
|
Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
A tensed fact is stated by a tensed sentence while a tenseless fact is stated by a tenseless sentence, and they belong to two 'realms' of reality. That Socrates drank hemlock is in the temporal realm, while 2+2=4 is presumably in the timeless realm.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 07)
|
|
A reaction:
Put so strongly, I suddenly find sales resistance to his proposal. All my instincts favour one realm, and I take 2+2=4 to be a highly general truth about that realm. It may be a truth of any possible realm, which would distinguish it.
|
|
23540
|
Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
If 'P is red' and 'P is orange' are indefinite, then 'P is red and P is orange' seems false, because red and orange are exclusive. But if two conjoined indefinite sentences are false, that makes 'P is red and P is red' false, when it should be indefinite.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] This is the problem of 'penumbral connection', where two indefinite values are still logically related, by excluding one another. Presumably 'P is red and P is of indefinite shape' can be true? Doubtful about this argument.
|
|
23546
|
Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
Standard notions of vagueness all accept borderline cases, and presuppose a higher standpoint from which a judgement of being borderline F, rather than simply being F or being not F, can be made.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 3)
|
|
A reaction:
He says that the concept of borderline cases is an impediment to understanding vagueness. Proposing a third group when you are struggling to separate two other groups doesn't seem helpful, come to think of it. Limbo cases.
|
|
9768
|
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
I take vagueness to be a semantic feature, a deficiency of meaning. It is to be distinguished from generality, undecidability, and ambiguity.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], Intro)
|
|
A reaction:
Sounds good. If we cut nature at the joints with our language, then nature is going to be too subtle and vast for our finite and gerrymandered language, and so it will break down in tricky situations. But maybe epistemology precedes semantics?
|
|
9776
|
A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
There is a possibility of 'higher-order vagueness'. The vague may be vague, or vaguely vague, and so on. If J has few hairs on his head than H, then he may be a borderline case of a borderline case.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 5)
|
|
A reaction:
Such slim grey areas can also be characterised as those where you think he is definitely bald, but I am not so sure.
|
|
9770
|
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
With a three-value approach, if P is 'blob is pink' and R is 'blob is red', then P&P is indefinite, but P&R is false, and P∨P is indefinite, but P∨R is true. This means the connectives & and ∨ are not truth-functional.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
The point is that there could then be no logic in any way classical for vague sentences and three truth values. A powerful point.
|
|
9773
|
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
With the super-truth approach, if P is 'blob is pink' and R is 'blob is red', then P&R is false, and P∨R is true, since one of P and R is true and one is false in any complete and admissible specification. It encompasses all 'penumbral truths'.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 3)
|
|
A reaction:
[See Idea 9767 for the super-truth approach, and Idea 9770 for a contrasting view] The approach, which seems quite appealing, is that we will in no circumstances give up basic classical logic, but we will make maximum concessions to vagueness.
|