Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Archimedes, Brian Clegg and Gottfried Leibniz

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6 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Even if this whole life were said to be only a dream, and the visible world only a phantasm, I should call this dream or phantasm real enough if we were never deceived by it when we make good use of reason.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1502), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
     A reaction: I find this response more satisfactory than his response in Idea 12740. As a supporter of the coherence account of justification, I take the closest we get to knowledge to be when our full critical faculties and experience are brought to bear, and shared.
The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The most powerful criterion of the reality of phenomena, sufficient even by itself, is success in predicting future phenomena from past and present ones.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1502), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
     A reaction: I would say that this is clutching at straws, as there is no reason at all to deny that dreams could be thoroughly coherent and predictable in their events. We must just live with these doubts, not try to defeat them.
The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: If there were no divisions of matter in nature, there would be no things that are different; just the mere possibility of things. It is the actual division into masses that really produces things that appear distinct, which presupposes simple substances.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704 or 1705)
     A reaction: This shows Leibniz to be a straightforward realist about the physical world, and certainly not an 'idealist', despite the mind-like character of monads. I take this to be an argument for reality from best explanation, which is all that's available.
The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We don't have, nor should we hope for, any mark of reality in phenomena, but the fact that they agree with one another and with eternal truths.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1706.01.19)
     A reaction: Elsewhere he says that divisions in appearance imply divisions in matter. Now he adds two further arguments in favour of realism, but admits that nothing conclusive is available. Quite right.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Only unities have any reality [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is no reality in anything except the reality of unities.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704.06.30), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9
     A reaction: This seems to leave indeterminate stuff like air and water with no reality, as nicely discussed by Henry Laycock. Do we just force unities on the world because that is the only way our minds can cope with it?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In actual things nothing is indefinite.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1706.01.19)
     A reaction: This seems to be the germ of the controversial modern view of Williamson, that vagueness is entirely epistemic, and that the facts of nature are entirely definite. Thus there is a tallest short giraffe, which I find a bit hard to grasp.