display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
6 ideas
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
Full Idea: An expansive friend of the controversial entities who says they all exist may be called an 'allist'; a tough desert-dweller who says that none of them exist may be called a 'noneist'. | |
From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.152) | |
A reaction: Lewis gives examples of the obvious and the controversial entities. Lewis implies that he himself is in between. The word 'desert' is a reference to Quine. |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If 'existence' is understood so that it can be a substantive thesis that only some of the things there are exist, we will have none of it. | |
From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.163) | |
A reaction: Lewis is a strong advocate, following Quine, of the univocal sense of the word 'exist', and I agree with them. |
15789 | Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis] |
Full Idea: I suggest that Lewis's view in fact is just Meinong's view. ...Meinong distinguishes between 'existing' and merely 'subsisting', Lewis between 'being actual' and merely 'existing'. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 06 | |
A reaction: Lewis attempts to make actuality purely 'indexical' in character, like distinguishing the world 'here' from the world 'elsewhere', but Lycan seems right that he is committed to more than that. |
10470 | There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver] |
Full Idea: Lewis's multi-purpose ontology seems to have only two kinds: sets and possibilia (actual and possible particulars). | |
From: report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 3 | |
A reaction: This is awfully like the ontology of his teacher Quine, but with the wicked addition of modal properties. It is no wonder that Lewis was a bit vague about the concrete boundary, as both of his kinds seem to be abstract. His Achilles' Heel? |
15520 | Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Existence cannot be a matter of degree. If you say there is something that exists to a diminished degree, once you've said 'there is' your game is up. | |
From: David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 3.5) | |
A reaction: You might have thought that this was so obvious as to be not worth saying, but as far as I can see it is a minority view in contemporary philosophy. It was Quine's view, and it is mine. |
14401 | Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Every proposition, no matter what subject matter it may have, is entirely about being. | |
From: David Lewis (Things qua Truthmakers [2003], p.26), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Truth and Ontology 4.VI | |
A reaction: Since Lewis's propositions are sets of possible worlds, I presume this claim is made because proposition relates to all of the possible worlds, which therefore presumably embody Being. |