Combining Philosophers

Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Anthony Quinton and Ludwig Feuerbach

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2 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

12226	The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
	Full Idea: Identity is sometimes read so that 'Pegasus is Pegasus' expresses a truth, the non-existence of any winged horse notwithstanding.
	From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §5)
	A reaction: This would give you ontological commitment to truth, without commitment to existence. It undercuts the use of identity statements as the basis of existence claims, which was Frege's strategy.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems

19446	To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
	Full Idea: To sensuous consciousness it is precisely language that is unreal, nothing.
	From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.77)
	A reaction: Offered as a corrective to the view that our ontological commitments entirely concern what we are willing to say.