display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If abstractions were defined by whether they could affect human sense-organs, light-waves would be concrete but radio waves abstract. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This is a pretty good baseline example. No account should draw an abstract/concrete line through the electromagnetic spectrum. |
10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
Full Idea: Dummett distinguishes, roughly, between those concrete objects which can be possible objects of ostension, and abstract objects which can only be referred to by functional expressions whose argument is some other object. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.3.II | |
A reaction: At least someone has proposed a theory! Hale gives a nice critical discussion of the proposal. It is a moot point whether in the second case, when you pick out the 'other object', you are thereby able to refer to some new abstract object. |
10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The dichotomy between concrete and abstract objects comes to seem far too crude: to which of the two categories should we assign the Mistral, for instance? | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: He has previously given colours and points as difficult borderline cases. We can generalise this particular problem case as the question of whether a potentiality or possibility is abstract or concrete. |
10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
Full Idea: There is no reason for wanting a sharp distinction between concrete and abstract objects. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This rather depends on your ontology. If you are happy for reality to be full of weird non-physical entities, then the blurring won't bother you. If the boundary is blurred but still real, it is a very interesting one. |
9884 | The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The distinction between concrete and abstract objects, or Frege's corresponding distinction between actual and non-actual objects, is not a sharp dichotomy, but resembles a scale upon which objects occupy a range of positions. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.18) | |
A reaction: This might seem right if you live (as Dummett chooses to) in the fog of language, but it surely can't be right if you think about reality. Is the Equator supposed to be near the middle of his scale? Either there is an equator, or there isn't. |