Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Arthur N. Prior and Leon Horsten

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4 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
     Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact.
     From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b
     A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful.
We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten]
     Full Idea: While positive and perhaps even negative atomic facts may be unproblematic, it seems excessive to commit oneself to the existence of logically complex facts such as disjunctive facts.
     From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1)
     A reaction: Presumably it is hard to deny that very complex statements involving massive disjunctions can be true or false. But why does commitment to real facts have to involve a huge ontology? The ontology is just the ingredients of the fact, isn't it?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten]
     Full Idea: If 'Britain is large' and 'Italy is large' lack truth values, then so must 'Britain or Italy is large' - so on the supervaluationist account the truth value of a disjunction is not determined by the truth values of its disjuncts.
     From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 06.2)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 15362 to get the full picture here.
If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten]
     Full Idea: If 'Italy is a large country' lacks a truth value, then so too, presumably, does 'Italy is not a large country'. But 'Italy is or is not a large country' is true, on the supervaluationist account, because it is a truth of classical propositional logic.
     From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 06.2)
     A reaction: See also Idea 15363. He cites Fine 1975.