Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Plotinus and Aristotle

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9 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change

22960	The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: The sophists assume that being Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum is different from being Coriscus-in-the-marketplace.
	From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 219b19)
	A reaction: This is what has now been called 'Cambridge change', which is merely change in relations, with no intrinsic change. It is laughed at, but it is a phenomenon worth pointing out, as long as it is not mislabelled, or misunderstood.

1700	There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place. A change in our affections would be an example of alteration.
	From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 15a13)

16115	Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: Change is the actuality of that which exists potentially, in so far as it is potentially this actuality. Thus, the actuality of a thing's capacity for alteration, in so far as it is a capacity for alteration, is alteration.
	From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 201a10)
	A reaction: Not very informative, until you add Idea 16114, telling us that potentiality is best seen as 'power'. Then we have 'all change is the active expression of powers', which strikes me as rather interesting.

16100	True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: In that which underlies a change there is a factor corresponding to the definition [logon] and there is a material factor. When a change is in these constitutive factors there is coming to be or passing away, but in a thing's qualities it is alteration.
	From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317a24)
	A reaction: This seems to be a key summary of Aristotle's account of change, in the context of his hylomorphism (form-plus-matter). The logos is the account of the thing, which seems to be the definition, which seems to give the form (principle or structure).

16101	A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: When a change occurs in the qualities [pathesi] and is accidental [sumbebekos], there is alteration (rather than true change).
	From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317a27)
	A reaction: [tr. partly Gill] Aristotle doesn't seem to have a notion of 'properties' in quite our sense. 'Pathe' seems to mean experienced qualities, rather than genuine causal powers. Gill says 'pathe' are always accidental.

12133	If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: Since we must distinguish the substratum and the property whose nature is to be predicated of the substratum,..there is alteration when the substratum persists...but when nothing perceptible persists as a substratum, this is coming-to-be and passing-away.
	From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319b08-16)
	A reaction: As usual, Aristotle clarifies the basis of the problem, by distinguishing two different types of change. Notice the empirical character of his approach, resting on whether or not the substratum is 'perceptible'.

16118	Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: Nature [phusis] is in the same genus as dunamis [power/potential], for it is an active principle of change, but not in another thing but in the thing itself qua itself.
	From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1049a09)
	A reaction: [Gill's translation; Lawson-Tancred refers to 'A nature' rather than 'nature', which implies an essence]. It seems like phusis is intrinsic, and dunamis is relational. Two sorts of power?

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes

13213	All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: Every coming-to-be is a passing away of something else and every passing-away some other thing's coming-to-be.
	From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319a07)
	A reaction: This seems to be the closest that Aristotle gets to sympathy with the Heraclitus view that all is flux. When a sparrow dies and disappears, I am not at all clear what comes to be, except some ex-sparrow material.

15768	An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: An actuality is thought most normally to be a process.
	From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1047a30)
	A reaction: He comments of this that he wishes to include entelechies (unified items) in the general account, and not just processes. To present everything as fundamentally a process is a hard story to tell with full coherence, I think.