Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Dale Jacquette and Roy Sorensen

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3 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette]
     Full Idea: The principles of pure philosophical ontology are indistinguishable ... from the conceptual foundations of logic.
     From: Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Pref)
     A reaction: I would take Russell to be an originator of this view. If the young Wittgenstein showed that the foundations of logic are simply conventional (truth tables), this seems to make ontology conventional too, which sounds very odd indeed (to me).
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Vague words have hidden boundaries. The subtraction of a single grain of sand might turn a heap into a non-heap.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], Intro)
     A reaction: The first sentence could be the slogan for the epistemic view of vagueness. The opposite view is Sainsbury's - that vague words are those which do not have any boundaries. Sorensen admits his view is highly counterintuitive. I think I prefer Sainsbury.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette]
     Full Idea: The entities included in a theoretical ontology are those minimally required for an adequate philosophical semantics. ...These are the objects that we say exist, to which we are ontologically committed.
     From: Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Pref)
     A reaction: Worded with exquisite care! He does not say that ontology is reducible to semantics (which is a silly idea). We could still be committed, as in a ghost story, to existence of some 'nameless thing'. Things utterly beyond our ken might exist.