display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
9 ideas
9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
Full Idea: If one says that 'everything that exists is causally active', that rules out abstracta (notably sets and numbers), and it rules out objects that are causally isolated. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.5) | |
A reaction: I like the principle. I take abstracta to be brain events, so they are causally active, within highly refined and focused brains, and if your physics is built on the notion of fields then I would think a 'causally isolated' object incoherent. |
9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
Full Idea: If one's naturalistic principles are formulated in terms of supervenience, then necessary entities are left untouched. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.5) | |
A reaction: I take this to be part of the reason why some people like supervenience - that it leaves a pure 'space of reasons' which is unreachable from the flesh and blood inside a cranium. Personall I like the space of reasons, but I drop the 'pure'. |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: One of the assumptions of logical atomism is that all structural properties, all complex properties, are composed of simple properties and relations. ...But does the totality of the simple properties consist of the only possible simple properties? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.3) | |
A reaction: This refers to what Lewis calls 'alien' properties - possible properties that cannot even be constructed from actual properties. Armstrong's question is about the truthmakers for such things. A bit speculative... |
8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers (like Devitt) think of reality as made up of things. Others, like me, think of it as made up of facts or states of affairs. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3) | |
A reaction: Devitt is a follower of Quine on this. Personally I rather like 'processes'. Unanalysed things with predication (Quine) don't look promising. I currently favour things with active powers, which give rise to properties. See Shoemaker and Ellis. |
6780 | Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories [Bird] |
Full Idea: There is anti-realism with regard to unobservable entities and the theories that purport to mention them, but the more plausible version attaches to theories concerning what laws of nature are. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This sounds right. I certainly find anti-realism about the entities of science utterly implausible. I also doubt whether there is any such thing as a law, above and beyond the behaviour of matter. Theories float between the two. |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I define 'naturalism' as the hypothesis that the world of space-time is all that there is. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1) | |
A reaction: This is helpful, because it doesn't mention the nature of the physical matter contained in space-time, leaving theories like panpsychism as possible naturalistic theories. Galen Strawson, for example. |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Armstrong has difficulty explaining how laws entail regularities. There is no real modality in the basic components of the world, but he wants to support counterfactuals. His official position is a kind of fictionalism. | |
From: comment on David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], 49-51) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 4.4.4 | |
A reaction: Armstrong seems to be up against the basic problems that laws won't explain anything if they are merely regularities (assuming they are not decrees of a supernatural force). |
17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Negative facts appear to be supervenient upon the positive facts, which suggests that they are nothing more than the positive facts. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.3) |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There must exist states of affairs as truthmakers, to get us beyond 'loose and separate' entities. ...They can be bundles of tropes, or trope-with-particular, or bundles of universals ('compresence'), or instantiations. They are an addition to ontology. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.5) | |
A reaction: Armstrong is the great champion of states of affairs. They seem rather vague to me, and disconcertingly timeless. |