display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
Full Idea: Psychologists have attempted to determine whether a concept of a category stores some causal knowledge about the members, some knowledge about their typical properties, or some knowledge about specific members. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.3.2) | |
A reaction: I take there to be a psychological process of 'generalisation', so that knowledge of individuals is not and need not be retained. I am dubious about entities called 'properties', so I will vote for causal (including perceptual) knowledge. |
18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
Full Idea: Are categorisation under time pressure and categorisation without time pressure ...two different cognitive competences? | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 5.1.1) | |
A reaction: This is a psychologist's question. Introspectively, they do seem to be rather different, as there is no time for theorising and explaining when you are just casting your eyes over the landscape. |
18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
Full Idea: I contend that the best available evidence suggests that for each category of objects an individual typically has several concepts. For instance, instead of having a single concept of dog, an individual has in fact several concepts of dog. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: Machery's book is a sustained defence of this hypothesis, with lots of examples from psychology. Any attempt by philosophers to give a neat and tidy account of categorisation looks doomed. |
18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
Full Idea: A to-be-classified object is considered a category member to the extent that its features were likely to have been generated by the category's causal laws. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.4.4) | |
A reaction: [from Bob Rehder, psychologist, 2003] This is an account of categorisation which arises from the Theory Theory view of concepts, of which I am a fan. I love this idea, which slots neatly into the account I have been defending. Locke would like this. |
18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
Full Idea: There may be ad hoc categories, as when people think about the things to pack in a small suitcase for a trip abroad. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.4.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be obviously correct, though critics might say that 'category' is too grand a term for such a grouping. |