display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
7 ideas
2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
Full Idea: Examples where reductionism seems to give a good account of things are light, genes, temperature and transparency. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.025) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This a fairly simple examples, thoroughly confirmed by science a long time ago. Life is a nicer example, because it is more complex and less obvious, but pretty much beyond dispute these days. |
3536 | Supervenient properties must have matching base properties [Kim] |
Full Idea: Each supervenient property necessarily has a coextensive property in the base family. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Concepts of supervenience [1984], §5) | |
A reaction: This is presumably the minimum requirement for a situation of supervenience. How do you decide which property is the 'base' property? Do we just mean that the base causes the other, but not vice versa? |
2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is customary to associate supervenience with the idea of dependence or determination. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.011) | |
A reaction: It is only 'customary' because, in principle, the supervenience might just be a coincidence. I might follow someone everywhere because I love them (dependence) or because they force me to (determination). There's always a reason. |
2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
Full Idea: Mereological supervenience is the doctrine that wholes are fixed by the properties and relations that characterise their parts. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.018) | |
A reaction: Presumably this would be the opposite of 'holism'. Personally I would take mereological supervenience to be not merely correct, but to be metaphysically necessary. Don't ask me to prove it, of course. |
13745 | Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is a mistake, or at least misleading, to think of supervenience itself as a special and distinctive type of dependence relation, alongside causal dependence, mereological dependence, semantic dependence, and others. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Postscripts on supervenience [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: The point, I take it, is that supervenience is something which requires explanation, rather than being a conclusion to the debate. Why are statues beautiful? Why do brains generate minds? |
13746 | Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Supervenience itself is not an explanatory relation, not a 'deep' metaphysical relation; rather it is a 'surface' relation that reports a pattern of property covariation, suggesting the presence of an interesting dependency relation that might explain it. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Postscripts on supervenience [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: I think the underlying idea here is that supervenience appeals to the Humean view of physical laws as mere regularities, but it is no good for those who seek underlying mechanisms to explain the patterns and regularities. Humeans are wrong. |
3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
Full Idea: Supervenience opens up the possibility of a relationship that gives us determination, or dependence, without reduction (as beauty supervenes on physical properties, but can't be given a physical definition). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.223) | |
A reaction: Beauty is a bad analogy, since it rather obviously involves a beholder. There is nothing more to a statue than a substance of a certain shape. There are no good analogies for this sort of supervenience, because it doesn't exist. |