display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: We have, I think, shown the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §21) | |
A reaction: He achieves this by an attack on universals, offering the nominalist view that there are only particulars. There seems to be a middle ground, where universals don't actually exist, but there are settled conventional abstraction, beyond particulars. |
3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.205) | |
A reaction: This may just be a reasonable application of Ockham's Razor, but I fear that Berkeley painted himself into corner by demanding too many 'reasons' for everything. |
3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: I know that nothing inconsistent can exist. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.224) | |
A reaction: Fine, but the problem is to assess with confidence what is inconsistent. Human imagination seems to be the test for existence. But what else can we do? |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
Full Idea: I think that we should consider Berkeley as believing in trees; we should simply claim that he has false beliefs about what trees are. | |
From: report of George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710]) by Ross P. Cameron - Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology 'Realism' | |
A reaction: I can be realist about spots before my eyes, or a ringing in my ears, but be (quite sensibly) unsure about what they are, so Cameron's suggestion sounds plausible. |