Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Tim Crane and Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama)

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4 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane]
     Full Idea: It is sometimes said that the aesthetic properties of a thing supervene on its physical properties.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.16)
     A reaction: A confusing example, as aesthetic properties only exist if there is an observer. Is 'supervenience' just an empty locution which tries to avoid reduction?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane]
     Full Idea: A statue is constituted by the marble that makes it up. It is plausible to say that constitution is not the same as identity - since identity is symmetrical and identity is not - but nonetheless constitution is a supervenience relation.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.16)
     A reaction: So what makes it a statue, as opposed to a piece of marble? It may well be an abstraction which only exists relative to observers.
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic.