Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Melvin Fitting, Neil E. Williams and J Ladyman / D Ross

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4 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
23783 Change exists, it is causal, and it needs an explanation [Williams,NE]
     Full Idea: There is a phenomenon of change. I am starting with the assumptions that it is a causal phenomenon, and that it requires explanation.
     From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 06.1)
     A reaction: That is, I take it, that we need a theory which explains change, rather than just describing it. Well said. Williams says, roughly, that each stage causes the next stage.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
14947 Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross]
     Full Idea: Reference to transfer of some (in principle) quantitatively measurable information is a highly general way of describing any process.
     From: J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 4.3)
     A reaction: That does not, of course, mean that that is what a process is. A waterfall is an archetypal process, but it is a bit more than a bunch of information. Actually its complexity may place its information beyond measurement.
23784 Processes don't begin or end; they just change direction unexpectedly [Williams,NE]
     Full Idea: No process every really starts or ends. …A process we see as derailed is really just an expected sequence that continues in an unexpected direction.
     From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 06.3)
     A reaction: Obviously if you cannot individuate processes, then the concept of a process is not much use in ontology. Williams rejects processes, and I think he is probably right. He breaks processes down into smaller units.
23790 Processes are either strings of short unchanging states, or continuous and unreducible events [Williams,NE]
     Full Idea: Processes can be modelled in two ways. They are drawn out events encompassing many changes, but dissectible into short-lived states, none including change. Or they are continuous and impenetrable, and to split them is impossible.
     From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 09.3)
     A reaction: Obviously a process has temporal moments in it, so the unsplittability is conceptual. I find the concept of changeless parts baffling. But if processes are drawn out, they can't be basic to ontology.