Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stephen Mumford, Hugo Grotius and Arnauld / Nicole

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
9427 For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford]
     Full Idea: For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 03.6)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10502 We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: I can start with a triangle, and rise by degrees to all straight-lined figures and to extension itself. The lower degree will include the higher degree. Since the higher degree is less determinate, it can represent more things.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: [compressed] This attempts to explain the generalising ability of abstraction cited in Idea 10501. If you take a complex object and eliminate features one by one, it can only 'represent' more particulars; it could hardly represent fewer.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
14334 Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
     Full Idea: The claim of modest realism is that there is a subject-independent reality; the presumptuous claim is that we are capable of describing that reality accurately.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 09.1)
     A reaction: And the super-presumptuous claim is that there only exists one ultimate accurate description of reality. I am happy to call myself a Modest Realist on this one.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
14306 Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
     Full Idea: The anti-realist declines to permit that all statements have truth-values. ...The essence of the anti-realist position is that evidence and ontology cannot be separated.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 03.6)
     A reaction: [second half on p.51] The idea that evidence and ontology are 'inseparable' strikes me as an absurd idea. The proposal that you should not speculate about ontology without some sort of evidence is, of course, not unreasonable.