Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stilpo, Gottlob Frege and R Kaplan / E Kaplan

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8 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence

8643	Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege]
	Full Idea: Affirmation of existence is nothing but denial of the number nought.
	From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §53)
	A reaction: Mathematicians - don't you luv 'em. No doubt this is helpful in placing existence within the great network of logical inferences, but his 'nothing but' is laughable. I don't see much existential anguish in the denial of zero.

11008	Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read]
	Full Idea: When Kant said that existence was not a property, what he meant was, according to Frege, that existence is not a first-order property - it is not a property of individuals but a property of properties, that the property has an instance.
	From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence

19470	Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege]
	Full Idea: Thoughts are neither things in the external world nor ideas. A third realm must be recognised. Anything in this realm has it in common with ideas that it cannot be perceived by the senses, and does not need an owner to belong with his consciousness.
	From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.337(69))
	A reaction: This important idea is the creed for modern platonists. We don't have to accept Forms, or any particular content, but there is a mode of existence which is distinct from both mental and physical, and is the residence of 'abstracta'. I deny it!

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being

5657	Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton]
	Full Idea: Frege's quantificational logic vindicates Kant's insight that existence is not a predicate and leads to fallacies when treated as one; and we might also say, despite Hegel, that there is no concept of being.
	From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.17
	A reaction: I notice that Colin McGinn has questioned the value of quantificational logic. It is difficult to assert that 'there is no concept of x', if several people have written large books about it.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence

8911	If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege]
	Full Idea: Frege's identification of the abstract with the realm of non-mental things entails that unobservables such as quarks are abstract. The abstract nature of chess, and the possibility of abstracta in the mind of God, show they can be mind-dependent.
	From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Gideon Rosen - Abstract Objects 'Way of Neg'
	A reaction: I like the robust question 'if a is said to 'exist', what is it said to be made of?' I consider the views of Frege to have had too much influence in this area, and recognising the role of the mind (psychology!) in abstraction is a start.

8634	The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege]
	Full Idea: We speak of the equator as an imaginary line, but it is not a fictitious line; it is not a creature of thought, the product of a psychological process, but is only recognised or apprehended by thought.
	From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §26)
	A reaction: Nice point. The same goes for the apparently very abstract and theoretical concept of a 'circle', because a perfect circle could be imagined in a very specific location, perhaps passing through three specified points.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

18899	Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
	Full Idea: Frege regarded the existence of horses as a property of the concept 'horse'.
	From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography 'Realism'

18995	Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo]
	Full Idea: Frege's theory treats existence as a property, not of things we call existent, but of concepts instantiated by those things. 'Biden exists' says our Biden-concept has instances. That is certainly not how it feels! We speak of the thing, not of concepts.
	From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892]) by Stephen Yablo - Aboutness 01.4
	A reaction: Yablo's point is that you must ask what the sentence is 'about', and then the truth will refer to those things. Frege gets into a tangle because he thinks remarks using concepts are about the concepts.