display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Among the simple things, we must also place their negation and deprivation, insofar as they fall under out intelligence, because the idea of nothingness, of the instant, of rest, is no less true an idea than that of existence, of duration, of motion. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
A reaction: He sees the 'simple' things as the foundation of all knowledge, because they are self-evident. Not sure about 'no less true', since the specific nothings are parasitic on the somethings. |
3644 | Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The fact that we often see two things joined together does not license the inference that they are one and the same. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Sixth Objections [1641], 444) | |
A reaction: Correct. The problem comes when they are never ever apart, and you begin to suspect that they are conjoined in all possible worlds. Why might this be so? It can only be identity or a causal link. |
19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |
Full Idea: It has been said that there are no disjunctive facts, conditional facts, or negative facts. ...but it is not at all clear why there cannot be facts of this sort. | |
From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.6) | |
A reaction: I love these sorts of facts, and offer them as a naturalistic basis for logic. You probably need the world to have modal features, but I have those in the form of powers and dispositions. |