display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
| 19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
| Full Idea: A fact is a thought that is true. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.342(74)) | |
| A reaction: It strikes me as pretty obvious that facts are not thoughts, because they concern the contents of thoughts. You can't discuss facts without the notion of what a thought is 'about'. If I think about my garden, the relevant fact is aspects of my garden. |
| 17431 | Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Frege seems to assimilate vagueness to incompleteness of definition. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Kathrin Koslicki - Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division 2.1 |
| 13879 | For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| Full Idea: For Frege, syntactic categories are prior to ontological ones, and it is by reference to the syntactic structure of true statements that ontological questions are to be understood and settled. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Crispin Wright - Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects 1.v |
| 10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Frege claims that second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, just as singular first-order quantifiers are committed to objects. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Øystein Linnebo - Plural Quantification 5.3 | |
| A reaction: It increasingly strikes me that Fregeans try to get away with this nonsense by diluting both the notion of a 'concept' and the notion of an 'object'. |