Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Archimedes, David Lewis and Niccolo Machiavelli
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28 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
15532
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'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15535
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We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis]
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15789
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Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
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10470
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There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver]
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15520
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Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
14401
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Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15540
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You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
15561
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The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
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15565
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Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
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15566
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Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
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15567
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Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
15564
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An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
8607
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Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis]
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3990
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The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
9650
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Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3991
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Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
8606
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A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
16210
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Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time [Lewis]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
15501
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We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
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15504
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Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
14213
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Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
8580
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Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
8909
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Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
15543
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How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
16458
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Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis]
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9057
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Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis]
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9671
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Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis]
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15538
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Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis]
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