Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Baron,S/Miller,K, Michael Dummett and Isaac Beeckman
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20 ideas
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
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8198
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A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
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23008
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Grounding is intended as a relation that fits dependences between things [Baron/Miller]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
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10540
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We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett]
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10515
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Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale]
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10544
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The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett]
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10546
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We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett]
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9884
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The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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22297
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Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter]
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9869
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Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett]
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15049
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Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett]
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8184
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Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
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3303
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For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA]
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8185
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We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett]
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8192
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I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
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8163
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Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
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8161
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We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
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21628
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To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
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8180
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'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
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10548
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The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett]
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10281
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The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett]
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