Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Celsus, Kit Fine and Mary Astell
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57 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
12214
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'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15078
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There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
14253
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An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
10145
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Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K]
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10136
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Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K]
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10144
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Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K]
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12212
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Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
12216
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Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K]
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12218
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Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
15007
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If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
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15006
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Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
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14262
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Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K]
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17272
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2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K]
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17276
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If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K]
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17284
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An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K]
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17285
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'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K]
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17288
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We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
15055
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Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
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17281
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If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K]
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17280
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Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17290
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Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K]
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14268
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Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
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17274
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Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
17278
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We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
15050
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Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
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15051
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Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
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15052
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Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
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15056
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The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
14254
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Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
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11151
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An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
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14251
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A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
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14257
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An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
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14261
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There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9210
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Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10563
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A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
12217
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For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15047
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What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
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15046
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Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
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15048
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In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
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15072
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Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
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9211
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A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
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15060
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Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
17287
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Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15071
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Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
23544
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Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
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23540
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Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
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23546
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Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
23542
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Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9768
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Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
9776
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A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9767
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A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
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9770
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Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
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9772
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Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
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9773
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With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
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9774
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Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
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23541
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Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
12213
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Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K]
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