Combining Philosophers
Ideas for David Fair, E.J. Lowe and John Heil
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11 ideas
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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7045
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Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
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7065
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Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
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8314
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Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
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8316
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Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
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8318
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The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
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8323
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It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
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8313
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Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
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8258
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Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe]
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8301
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Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
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18505
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Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
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18499
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Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil]
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