Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Dennis Whitcomb, Harr,R./Madden,E.H. and Jan Westerhoff

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20 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15261 Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
15268 Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
15257 The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
15300 Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
15319 Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
15320 Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
15318 Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
15267 Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
13124 Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff]
13117 How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff]
13116 Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff]
13118 Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff]
13125 Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff]
13126 Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff]
13130 Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
13131 The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
13123 All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
13115 Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff]
13119 Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff]
13135 A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff]