Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Donald Davidson, Stewart Shapiro and Metrodorus (Chi)

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16 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Everything exists which anyone perceives [Metrodorus of Chios]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan]
Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson]
Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro]
Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro]
Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider]