Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Edmund L. Gettier, Erving Goffman and Kit Fine
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26 ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
15007
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If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
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15006
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Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
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14262
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Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K]
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17272
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2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K]
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17276
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If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K]
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17284
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An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K]
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17285
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'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K]
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17288
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We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
15055
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Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
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17281
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If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K]
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17280
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Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17290
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Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K]
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14268
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Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
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17274
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Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
17278
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We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
15050
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Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
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15051
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Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
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15052
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Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
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15056
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The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
14254
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Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
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14261
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There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
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11151
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An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
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14251
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A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
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14257
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An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9210
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Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10563
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A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K]
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