display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
39 ideas
10241 | For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro] |
16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
4064 | The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane] |
19277 | Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale] |
16965 | All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine] |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
8205 | Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time [Quine] |
11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
1630 | We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
12210 | Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine] |
10243 | My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine] |
18438 | Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine] |
21598 | Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson] |
19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
8496 | What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine] |
11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
10667 | A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack] |
1610 | To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
5747 | "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia] |
16963 | Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine] |
16021 | Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan] |
16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
8459 | Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein] |
8497 | An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine] |
4216 | Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe] |
18966 | Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine] |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
3325 | For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
16261 | If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine] |
7698 | If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine] |
19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
14490 | You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine] |
16961 | In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine] |
16462 | The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine] |
11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |